Publications – Working Papers – Work in progress – Book Chapters and Policy Reports
Publications
Fabra, N. (2018) “A Primer on Capacity Mechanisms“, Energy Economics 75, 323-335.
Fabra, N. and García, A. (2015) “Dynamic Price Competition with Switching Costs”
Dynamic Games and Applications 5 (4), 540-567.
Fabra, N. and García, A. (2015) “Market Structure and the Competitive Effects of Switching Costs” Economics Letters 126, 150-155.
Fabra, N. and Reguant, M. (2014) “Passthrough of Emission Costs in Electricity Markets”
American Economic Review 104(9), 2872-2899.
Extended abstract
Highlighted in the NBER Digest, March 2014
Highlighted at Nature Climate Change 4, 860, October 2014
De Frutos, M.A. and Fabra, N. (2012) “How to Allocate Forward Contracts: the case of electricity markets” European Economic Review 56(3), 451-469.
Fabra, N., N.H. von der Fehr and M.A. De Frutos, M.A. (2011) “Market Design and Investment Incentives” Economic Journal 121, 1340–1360.
De Frutos, M.A. and Fabra, N. (2011) “Endogenous Capacities and Price Competition: the Role of Uncertainty” International Journal of Industrial Organization 29(4), 399-411.
Campos, E., N. Fabra and García, A. (2007) “Dynamic Auctions for On-demand Services” IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics 37 (6), 878-886.
Fabra, N. and Creti, A. (2007) “Supply Security and Short-Run Capacity Markets for Electricity” Energy Economics 29(2), 259-276.
Fabra, N. (2006) “Collusion with Capacity Constraints over the Business Cycle” International Journal of Industrial Organization 24(1), 69-81.
Fabra, N., and Toro, J. (2005) “Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market” International Journal of Industrial Organization 23(3), 155-181.
Fabra, N., N.H. von der Fehr and Harbord, D. (2006) “Designing Electricity Auctions” Rand Journal of Economics 37 (1), 23-346.
Crampes, C. and Fabra, N. (2005) “The Spanish Electricity Industry: Plus ca change…” The Energy Journal 26.
Fabra, N. (2003) “Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform versus Discriminatory auctions” Journal of Industrial Economics L1(3), 271-293.
Fabra, N., N.H. von der Fehr and Harbord, D. (2002) “Modelling Electricity Auctions” Electricity Journal 15(7), 72-81.
Working Papers
“Auctions with Unknown Capacities: Understanding Competition among Renewables“ with Gerard Llobet (October 2019)
We analyse equilibrium bidding behaviour in uniform-price auctions in which each firm’s capacity is stochastic and is private information. We use the model to shed light on the performance of renewables-dominated electricity markets.
CEPR Discussion Paper 14060
“Incentives for Information Provision: Energy Efficiency in the Spanish Rental Market“ with Xueying Bian (August 2019) New version!
We build a search mode with asymmetric information regarding houses’ energy efficiency. We show that the incentives to disclose energy efficiency labels in the rental market depend on the rent premium for more efficient houses but also on the rent penalty for unlabeled houses. The latter is increasing in the adoption rate of energy certificates in the local market. We provide empirical evidence of these predictions in the context of the Spanish rental market.
“A Model of Search with Price Discrimination“ with Mar Reguant (August 2019) New version!
We explore the interaction between price discrimination and competition in markets with search costs. We build a search model in which consumers differ in their willingness to pay as well as in their (private) search costs. Buyers’ willingness to pay shape their willingness to search, thus affecting the intensity of competition among firms for the various consumers. We provide a parametrization under which a ban on price discrimination is overall welfare improving.
A previous version of this paper was published as a CEPR Discussion Paper 12823
“Product Choice and Price Discrimination by Competing Firms“ with Juan Pablo Montero (September 2019) New version!
In a model of quality choices followed by price competition, we show that an arbitrarily small amount of search frictions is enough to rule out equilibria with non-overlapping qualities. In equilibrium, firms’ product lines overlap for all values of the search friction. This is the opposite to what occurs when horizontal differentiation is the source of market frictions: the equilibrium with non-overlapping qualities, which results in weak competition across firms, survives the introduction of small amounts of product differentiation. Therefore, the nature of market frictions is key to understand product choice and thus the tension between price discrimination and competition.
A previous version of this paper was published as a CEPR Discussion Paper 12046 [Slides]
“Antitrust Fines in Times of Crisis” with Massimo Motta (January 2013)
CEPR Discussion Paper 9290
Work in Progress
“Prices versus Quantities with Multiple Technologies” (withJuan Pablo Montero)
A principal (e.g., a regulator, a firm) needs to procure multiple units of a good or service that can be produced with heterogenous technologies. Should she procure these units by posting separate prices for each technology? Or should she instead procure these units by running technology-specific or technology-neutral auctions? In answering these questions, we identify the trade-offs involved. We show how the answers depend on the nature of the available technologies and the extent of information asymmetry regarding their costs.
“Pricing Schemes and Market Power: The Role of Forward Contracts and Arbitrage” (with Imelda)
We assess the role of forward contracts and arbitrage in mitigating the market power of dominant producers. This question is particularly relevant for the renewables’ policy debate, as alternative pricing schemes (Feed-in-Tariffs, Feed-in-
“Storing Power: on the Importance of Market Structure” (with David Andrés-Cerezo)
We asses firms’ incentives to operate and invest in electricity storage facilities under different market structures, including competitive and strategic storage owners in the cases in which the storage owner is integrated with a dominant electricity producer or it is a stand-alone firm. The results are key to understand how to regulate electricity storage, an issue which is critical for the deployment of renewables in electricity markets.
“On the Competitive Effects of Retention Strategies”
Retention offers allow firms to price discriminate across consumers with different willingness to switch: prices decrease for those consumers who are more likely to switch, but increase for those who are less likely to switch. In competitive markets, retention offers strengthen competitive pressure. However, if markets are not very competitive, they make them even less so.
“Promoting the Electric Vehicle: the Value of Low-Emissions Zones” (with Juan Pablo Montero)
Book Chapters
Fabra, N. and Motta, M. (2017) “Assessing Coordinated Effects in Merger Cases”
Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, (Corchon and Marini Eds.) Edward Elgar.
Policy Reports
In English:
Fabra, N., Matthes, F., Newbery, D. and Rüdinger, A. (2015) “The Energy Transition In Europe: Lessons from Germany, the UK and France”
A CERRE report
Fabra, N., Moraga, J.L. (2015) “Energy security and sustainability:what role for gas in the Energy Union?”
A CERRE Discussion Paper
Fabra, N. and M. Motta (2013) “Coordinated Effects in Merger Cases”
A report for the Mexican Competition Authority and the World Bank
Courty, P., N. Fabra, C. Fumagalli, M. Motta (2004) “Identical Price Categories in Oligopolistic Markets: Innocent Behaviour or Collusive Practice?”
A report for the Italian Competition Authority
In Spanish:
Fabra, N. (2018) “Mercados eléctricos y mecanismos de capacidad: cuándo, cómo y por qué” Papeles de Energía nº6, 53-76
Fabra, N. (2018) “La Transición Energética en el Sector Eléctrico: un imperativo para el medio ambiente y para la economía” Cuaderno de Trabajo Transición energética en España – Una propuesta desde la socialdemocracia, Fundación Pablo Iglesias
Fabra, N. (2018) “La Unión Energética: Instrumento para la Transición Energética en Europa” Revista de Economía ICE
Fabra, N. (2014) “Funcionamiento y Diseño de los Mercados Eléctricos: ¿Qué nos enseña la Teoría de Juegos?”
Economía Industrial 393, 25-32
Fabra, N, J.P. Montero, and M. Reguant (2013) “Competencia en el Mercado Eléctrico Chileno”
A report for the Fiscalía Nacional Económica de Chile
Fabra, N. and J. Fabra Utray (2012) “El Déficit Tarifario en el Sector Eléctrico Español”
Papeles de Economía Española 134
Fabra, N. and J. Fabra Utray (2010) “Competencia y Poder de Mercado en los Mercados Eléctricos”
Cuadernos Económicos del ICE 79, pp. 17-43
Fabra, N. (2010) “Modelo Energético Sostenible”
Chapter 17 in “La Ley de Economía Sostenible y la Reformas Estructurales: 25 propuestas”, FEDEA
Fabra, N. and J. Fabra Utray (2009) “Un Diseño de Mercado para el Sector Eléctrico Español”
Papeles de Economía Española 121, 141-158
Fabra, N. “El Funcionamiento del Mercado Eléctrico Español bajo la Ley del Sector Eléctrico”.
Chapter 10 in “Del Monopolio al Mercado. La Comisión Nacional de Energía: diez años en perspectiva”.
Fabra, N. (2006) “La Electricidad: Mercados, Inversiones, y Garantía de Suministro”
Economía Industrial 364, 63-74