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Publications – Working Papers – Work in progress – Book Chapters and Policy Reports

Research Statement

Publications

Fabra, N., O. Bover, S. García-Uribe, A. Lacuesta, and R. Ramos (2022) “Firms and Households during the Pandemic: What do we Learn from their Electricity Consumption?“, The Energy Journal. Forthcoming [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Imelda (2022) “Market Power and Price Exposure: Learning from Changes in Renewables Regulation“, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. Forthcoming. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Llobet, G. (2022) “Auctions with Privately Known Capacities” The Economic Journal. Forthcoming. [Cite] [Replication Package]

Fabra, N. and Montero, J. P. (2022) “Technology Neutral versus Technology Specific Procurement“, The Economic Journal. Forthcoming [Cite] [Replication Package]

Fabra, N. and Andrés-Cerezo, A. (2022) “Storing Power: Markets Structure Matters“, RAND Journal of Economics. Forthcoming. [Cite]

Fabra, N., A. Lacuesta and M. Souza (2022) “The Implicit Cost of Carbon Abatement during the COVID-19 Pandemic“,European Economic Review, 147, 104165  [Cite]

Fabra, N., M. Motta, and M. Peitz (2022). “Learning from Electricity Markets: How to Design a Resilience Strategy“, Energy Policy. 168,113116 [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Montero, J.P. (2022) “Product Lines and Price Discrimination in Markets with Information Frictions”, Management Science, 68 (2). [Cite]

Fabra, N. (2021) “The Energy Transition: an Industrial Economics Perspective“, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 79, 2021, 102734 [Cite]

Fabra, N., D. Rapson, M. Reguant, and J. Wang (2021) “Estimating the Elasticity to Real Time Pricing: Evidence from the Spanish Electricity Market“, American Economic Association Papers & Proceedings, 111, 425-29. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Reguant, M. (2020) “A Model of Search with Price Discrimination“, European Economic Review 129. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Bian, X. (2020) “Incentives for Information Provision: Energy Efficiency in the Spanish Rental Markets“, Energy Economics 90. [Cite]

Fabra, N. (2018) “A Primer on Capacity Mechanisms“, Energy Economics 75, 323-335. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and García, A. (2015) “Dynamic Price Competition with Switching Costs”, Dynamic Games and Applications 5 (4), 540-567. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and García, A. (2015) “Market Structure and the Competitive Effects of Switching Costs“, Economics Letters 126, 150-155. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Reguant, M. (2014) “Passthrough of Emission Costs in Electricity Markets”, American Economic Review 104(9), 2872-2899. Extended abstract
Highlighted in the NBER Digest, March 2014 and at Nature Climate Change  4, 860, October 2014. [Cite]

De Frutos, M.A. and Fabra, N. (2012) “How to Allocate Forward Contracts: the case of electricity markets“, European Economic Review 56(3), 451-469. [Cite]

Fabra, N., N.H. von der Fehr and M.A. De Frutos, M.A. (2011) “Market Design and Investment Incentives”, Economic Journal 121, 1340–1360. [Cite]

De Frutos, M.A. and Fabra, N. (2011) “Endogenous Capacities and Price Competition: the Role of Uncertainty“, International Journal of Industrial Organization 29(4), 399-411. [Cite]

Campos, E., N. Fabra and García, A. (2007) “Dynamic Auctions for On-demand Services“, IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics 37 (6), 878-886. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Creti, A. (2007) “Supply Security and Short-Run Capacity Markets for Electricity “, Energy Economics 29(2), 259-276. [Cite]

Fabra, N. (2006) “Collusion with Capacity Constraints over the Business Cycle“, International Journal of Industrial Organization 24(1), 69-81. [Cite]

Fabra, N., von der Fehr, N.H. and Harbord, D. (2006) “Designing Electricity Auctions“, Rand Journal of Economics 37 (1), 23-346. [Cite]

Fabra, N., and Toro, J. (2005) “Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market“, International Journal of Industrial Organization 23(3), 155-181. [Cite]

Crampes, C. and Fabra, N. (2005) “The Spanish Electricity Industry: Plus ca changes”, The Energy Journal 26. [Cite]

Fabra, N. (2003) “Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform versus Discriminatory auctions“, Journal of Industrial Economics L1(3), 271-293. [Cite]

Fabra, N., N.H. von der Fehr and Harbord, D. (2002) “Modelling Electricity Auctions“, Electricity Journal 15(7), 72-81 [Cite]

 

Working Papers

In the context of the debate about the reform of electricity markets in Europe, this document proposes a new electricity market architecture. It is based on two pillars: (i) a well-functioning short-run energy market; and (ii) a set of efficient and equitable long-run contracts, signed between firms and the regulator on behalf of all consumers. The design of long-term contracts takes into account the characteristics of the various technologies in order to strike the right balance between exposing them to the short-run price signals while de-risking the investments. The proposal would facilitate the achievement of carbon-free and diversified power markets, allowing for substantial reductions in the cost of electricity for consumers. The proposed design is mostly in line with the recent European Commission (2022b)’s proposal, and it further provides details on key elements that the European Commission has not yet specified.

We examine the distributional impacts of RTP by leveraging on a country-wide field experiment which started in 2015, when RTP became the default option for most Spanish households. Our results suggest that the distributional impacts of RTP were quite small and, if anything, slightly progressive. We also find stronger differences in the impacts across regions than across income groups.

We estimate the impacts on employment of local firms and unemployment of local residents following investments in renewable energies. We exploit the variation in the timing and size of the investment projects across Spanish municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants, over a 17 years period. We find low multipliers for employment of local firms that are mainly concentrated during the construction of the plant. Benefits are even more limited if one analyzes the impact on unemployment of those residing in the municipality of investment. The relatively small magnitude of the local effects suggests the possibility to put in place compensation schemes at the local level in order to more evenly distribute the benefits of renewable investments.

Work in Progress

  • “On the Complementarity between Renewable Energy and Storage” (with  D. Andrés-Cerezo)

We model an electricity market in which renewable energy coexists with storage. We show that the value of additional storage capacity is greater (lower) in markets with more renewable energy if the correlation between renewable energy and the net load is negative (positive). Furthermore, this degree of complementarity is higher the more market power there is in generation. We illustrate the model predictions with simulations of the Spanish electricity market.

  • “Electricity Bidding along the Energy Transition” (with Gerard Llobet)

Reducing carbon emissions in the electricity sector requires massive investments in renewable energy. How will this affect price formation in electricity markets? How will the effects differ across the various stages of the energy transition?

  • “The Welfare Effects of Car Sharing” (with Erich Muehlegger and Mateus Souza)

We match data from several sources to understand mobility patterns across the city of Madrid. We then build models for the choice of transportation mode, as well as the city’s congestion technology, taking into account the availability of parking across different areas. Within this context, we aim to estimate the welfare effects of car sharing along several dimensions.

 

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