- Fabra, N. (2021) “The Energy Transition: an Industrial Economics Perspective” The International Journal of Industrial Organization, Available online 15 April 2021.
- Fabra, N., D. Rapson, M. Reguant, and J. Wang (2021) “Estimating the Elasticity to Real Time Pricing: Evidence from the Spanish Electricity Market“, American Economic Association Papers & Proceedings, 111, 425-29.
- Fabra, N. and Montero, J.P. (2020) “Product Lines and Price Discrimination in Markets with Information Frictions”, Management Science, forthcoming.
- Fabra, N. and Reguant, M. (2020) “A Model of Search with Price Discrimination“, European Economic Review 129.
- Fabra, N. and Bian, X. (2020) “Incentives for Information Provision: Energy Efficiency in the Spanish Rental Markets“, Energy Economics 90.
- Fabra, N. (2018) “A Primer on Capacity Mechanisms“, Energy Economics 75, 323-335.
- Fabra, N. and García, A. (2015) “Dynamic Price Competition with Switching Costs”, Dynamic Games and Applications 5 (4), 540-567.
- Fabra, N. and García, A. (2015) “Market Structure and the Competitive Effects of Switching Costs“, Economics Letters 126, 150-155.
- Fabra, N. and Reguant, M. (2014) “Passthrough of Emission Costs in Electricity Markets”, American Economic Review 104(9), 2872-2899. Extended abstract
Highlighted in the NBER Digest, March 2014 and at Nature Climate Change 4, 860, October 2014
- De Frutos, M.A. and Fabra, N. (2012) “How to Allocate Forward Contracts: the case of electricity markets“, European Economic Review 56(3), 451-469.
- Fabra, N., N.H. von der Fehr and M.A. De Frutos, M.A. (2011) “Market Design and Investment Incentives”, Economic Journal 121, 1340–1360.
- De Frutos, M.A. and Fabra, N. (2011) “Endogenous Capacities and Price Competition: the Role of Uncertainty“, International Journal of Industrial Organization 29(4), 399-411.
- Campos, E., N. Fabra and García, A. (2007) “Dynamic Auctions for On-demand Services“, IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics 37 (6), 878-886.
- Fabra, N. and Creti, A. (2007) “Supply Security and Short-Run Capacity Markets for Electricity “, Energy Economics 29(2), 259-276.
- Fabra, N. (2006) “Collusion with Capacity Constraints over the Business Cycle“, International Journal of Industrial Organization 24(1), 69-81.
- Fabra, N., and Toro, J. (2005) “Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market“, International Journal of Industrial Organization 23(3), 155-181.
- Fabra, N., N.H. von der Fehr and Harbord, D. (2006) “Designing Electricity Auctions“, Rand Journal of Economics 37 (1), 23-346.
- Crampes, C. and Fabra, N. (2005) “The Spanish Electricity Industry: Plus ca change…”, The Energy Journal 26.
- Fabra, N. (2003) “Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform versus Discriminatory auctions“, Journal of Industrial Economics L1(3), 271-293.
- Fabra, N., N.H. von der Fehr and Harbord, D. (2002) “Modelling Electricity Auctions“, Electricity Journal 15(7), 72-81.
- “Firms and Households during the Pandemic: What do we Learn from their Electricity Consumption?“ (with Olympia Bover, Sandra García-Uribe, Aitor Lacuesta ad Roberto Ramos) Banco de España DO nº 2031 and CEPR Vetted and Real-Time Papers, Issue 63, 7 January 2021.
We analyze the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on electricity consumption patterns in Spain. We highlight the importance of decomposing total electricity consumption into consumption by firms and by households to better understand the economic and social impacts of the crisis. We also document a change in people’s daily routines in response to the stringency of the lockdown measures, as reflected in their hourly electricity consumption patterns.
- “Storing Power: Market Structure Matters” (with David Andrés-Cerezo) CEPR Discussion Paper 15444. R&R
We assess firms’ incentives to operate and invest in energy storage facilities under different market structures, including competitive and strategic storage owners in the cases in which the storage owner is integrated with a dominant electricity producer or it is a stand-alone firm. The results are key to understanding how to regulate energy storage, an issue which is critical for the deployment of renewables in electricity markets.
- “Market Power and Price Exposure: Learning from Changes in Renewables Regulation“ (with Imelda) CEPR Discussion Paper 16362. R&R.
We assess the impact of facing producers to varying degrees of price exposure on the market power. This question is particularly relevant for the renewables’ policy debate, as regulators can decide whether to face renewable producers to full, partial, or no price exposure, an issue that affects the performance of power markets. To identify these effects empirically, we exploit a natural experiment that took place in the Spanish electricity market, that switched the type of contract faced by wind producers.
- “Auctions with Privately Known Capacities” with Gerard Llobet (March 2021) CEPR Discussion Paper 14060. R&R
We analyse equilibrium bidding behaviour in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions in which each firm’s capacity is stochastic and is private information. We use the model to shed light on the performance of renewables-dominated electricity markets.
- “Degrowth versus Decoupling: Competing strategies for carbon abatement?” (with Aitor Lacuesta and Mateus Souza) R&R
We compare the “degrowth” versus the “decoupling” strategies for carbon abatement by leveraging the COVID-19 crisis as a natural experiment. Our focus is on the Spanish economy, and in particular, on its power sector. The GDP loss (degrowth) gives an implicit cost of carbon in the thousands. Investing in renewables to achieve similar abatement would have an implicit cost of carbon closer to 57 Euros/Ton.
- “Technology Neutral versus Technology Specific Procurement“ (with Juan Pablo Montero) CEPR Discussion Paper 15554 In submission.
Work in Progress
- “The Distributional Impacts of Real Time Pricing” (with M. Cahana, M. Reguant and J.Wang)
We examine the distributional impacts of RTP by leveraging on a country-wide field experiment which started in 2015, when RTP became the default option for most Spanish households. Our results suggest that the distributional impacts of RTP were quite small and, if anything, slightly progressive. We also find stronger differences in the impacts across regions than across income groups.
- “On the Competitive Effects of Retention Strategies”
Retention offers allow firms to price discriminate across consumers with different willingness to switch: prices decrease for those consumers who are more likely to switch, but increase for those who are less likely to switch. In competitive markets, retention offers strengthen competitive pressure. However, if markets are not very competitive, they make them even less so.
- Fabra, N., Labandeira, X. (2021) “The economics of the energy transition” SERIEs, Avaliable online 02 June 2021.
- Fabra, N. and Motta, M. (2017) “Assessing Coordinated Effects in Merger Cases” Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, (Corchon and Marini Eds.) Edward Elgar.
- Fabra, N., Matthes, F., Newbery, D. and Rüdinger, A. (2015) “The Energy Transition In Europe: Lessons from Germany, the UK and France“, A CERRE report
- Fabra, N., Moraga, J.L. (2015) “Energy security and sustainability: what role for gas in the Energy Union?“, A CERRE Discussion Paper
- Fabra, N. and M. Motta (2013) “Coordinated Effects in Merger Cases“, A report for the Mexican Competition Authority and the World Bank
- Courty, P., N. Fabra, C. Fumagalli, M. Motta (2004) “Identical Price Categories in Oligopolistic Markets: Innocent Behaviour or Collusive Practice?“, A report for the Italian Competition Authority
- Fabra, N. (2018) “Mercados eléctricos y mecanismos de capacidad: cuándo, cómo y por qué”, Papeles de Energía nº6, 53-76
- Fabra, N. (2018) “La Transición Energética en el Sector Eléctrico: un imperativo para el medio ambiente y para la economía”, Cuaderno de Trabajo Transición energética en España – Una propuesta desde la socialdemocracia, Fundación Pablo Iglesias
- Fabra, N. (2018) “La Unión Energética: Instrumento para la Transición Energética en Europa”, Revista de Economía ICE
- Fabra, N. (2014) “Funcionamiento y Diseño de los Mercados Eléctricos: ¿Qué nos enseña la Teoría de Juegos?”, Economía Industrial 393, 25-32
- Fabra, N, J.P. Montero, and M. Reguant (2013) “Competencia en el Mercado Eléctrico Chileno”, A report for the Fiscalía Nacional Económica de Chile
- Fabra, N. and J. Fabra Utray (2012) “El Déficit Tarifario en el Sector Eléctrico Español”, Papeles de Economía Española 134
- Fabra, N. and J. Fabra Utray (2010) “Competencia y Poder de Mercado en los Mercados Eléctricos”, Cuadernos Económicos del ICE 79, pp. 17-43
- Fabra, N. (2010) “Modelo Energético Sostenible”, Chapter 17 in “La Ley de Economía Sostenible y la Reformas Estructurales: 25 propuestas”, FEDEA
- Fabra, N. and J. Fabra Utray (2009) “Un Diseño de Mercado para el Sector Eléctrico Español”, Papeles de Economía Española 121, 141-158
- Fabra, N. “El Funcionamiento del Mercado Eléctrico Español bajo la Ley del Sector Eléctrico”, Chapter 10 in “Del Monopolio al Mercado. La Comisión Nacional de Energía: diez años en perspectiva”.
- Fabra, N. (2006) “La Electricidad: Mercados, Inversiones, y Garantía de Suministro”, Economía Industrial 364, 63-74