Research

Publications – Working Papers – Work in progress – Book Chapters and Policy Reports

Publications

Fabra, N., Gutiérrez E., Lacuesta A., and Ramos, R. (2024) “Do Renewable Energy Investments Create Local Jobs?“, Journal of Public Economics,  forthcoming.

Fabra, N., Pintassilgo, C. and Souza, M. (2024) “Observed Patterns of Use and Users of Free-Floating Car-Sharing“, SERIEs, forthcoming. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Reguant, M. (2024) “The Energy Transition. A Balancing Act“, Resource and Energy Economics. 76. [Cite]

Fabra, N., (2023) “Reforming European Electricity Markets: Lessons from the Energy Crisis“, Energy Economics. 126, 106963. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Imelda (2023) “Market Power and Price Exposure: Learning from Changes in Renewables Regulation“, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 15 (4), 323-358. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Llobet, G. (2023) “Auctions with Privately Known Capacities: Understanding Competition among Renewable Energies”, The Economic Journal. 133 (651), 1106-1146. [Cite] [Replication Package]

Fabra, N. and Montero, J. P. (2023) “Technology Neutral versus Technology Specific Procurement“, The Economic Journal, 133 (650), 669-705. [Cite] [Replication Package]

Fabra, N. and Andrés-Cerezo, D. (2023) “Storing Power: Markets Structure Matters“, RAND Journal of Economics, 54 (1), 3-53. [Cite]

Fabra, N., A. Lacuesta and M. Souza (2022) “The Implicit Cost of Carbon Abatement during the COVID-19 Pandemic“, European Economic Review, 147, 104-165.  [Cite]

Fabra, N., M. Motta, and M. Peitz (2022). “Learning from Electricity Markets: How to Design a Resilience Strategy“, Energy Policy, 168, 113-116 [Cite]

Fabra, N., O. Bover, S. García-Uribe, A. Lacuesta, and R. Ramos (2022) “Firms and Households during the Pandemic: What do we Learn from their Electricity Consumption?“, The Energy Journal, 44(3). [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Montero, J.P. (2022) “Product Lines and Price Discrimination in Markets with Information Frictions”,  Management Science, 68 (2). [Cite]

Fabra, N. (2021) “The Energy Transition: an Industrial Economics Perspective“, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 79, 102-134 [Cite]

Fabra, N., D. Rapson, M. Reguant, and J. Wang (2021) “Estimating the Elasticity to Real Time Pricing: Evidence from the Spanish Electricity Market“, American Economic Association Papers & Proceedings, 111, 425-29. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Reguant, M. (2020) “A Model of Search with Price Discrimination“, European Economic Review, 129. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Bian, X. (2020) “Incentives for Information Provision: Energy Efficiency in the Spanish Rental Markets“, Energy Economics, 90. [Cite]

Fabra, N. (2018) “A Primer on Capacity Mechanisms“, Energy Economics 75, 323-335. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and García, A. (2015) “Dynamic Price Competition with Switching Costs”,  Dynamic Games and Applications 5 (4), 540-567. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and García, A. (2015) “Market Structure and the Competitive Effects of Switching Costs“, Economics Letters 126, 150-155. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Reguant, M. (2014) “Passthrough of Emission Costs in Electricity Markets”, American Economic Review 104(9), 2872-2899. Extended abstract
Highlighted in the NBER Digest, March 2014 and at Nature Climate Change  4, 860, October 2014. [Cite]

De Frutos, M.A. and Fabra, N. (2012) “How to Allocate Forward Contracts: the case of electricity markets“, European Economic Review 56(3), 451-469. [Cite]

Fabra, N., N.H. von der Fehr and M.A. De Frutos, M.A. (2011) “Market Design and Investment Incentives”, Economic Journal 121, 1340–1360. [Cite]

De Frutos, M.A. and Fabra, N. (2011) “Endogenous Capacities and Price Competition: the Role of Uncertainty“, International Journal of Industrial Organization 29(4), 399-411. [Cite]

Campos, E., N. Fabra and García, A. (2007) “Dynamic Auctions for On-demand Services“, IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics 37 (6), 878-886. [Cite]

Fabra, N. and Creti, A. (2007) “Supply Security and Short-Run Capacity Markets for Electricity “, Energy Economics 29(2), 259-276. [Cite]

Fabra, N. (2006) “Collusion with Capacity Constraints over the Business Cycle“, International Journal of Industrial Organization 24(1), 69-81. [Cite]

Fabra, N., von der Fehr, N.H. and Harbord, D. (2006) “Designing Electricity Auctions“, Rand Journal of Economics 37 (1), 23-346. [Cite]

Fabra, N., and Toro, J. (2005) “Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market“, International Journal of Industrial Organization 23(3), 155-181. [Cite]

Crampes, C. and Fabra, N. (2005) “The Spanish Electricity Industry: Plus ca changes”, The Energy Journal 26. [Cite]

Fabra, N. (2003) “Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform versus Discriminatory auctions“, Journal of Industrial Economics L1(3), 271-293. [Cite]

Fabra, N., N.H. von der Fehr and Harbord, D. (2002) “Modelling Electricity Auctions“, Electricity Journal 15(7), 72-81 [Cite]

 

Working Papers

In markets where renewables availability moves procyclically in relation to demand and renewable capacity is small, increasing storage (renewable) capacity negatively impacts renewable (storage) firms and total welfare. The same applies to the “scarce” renewable technology in multi-technology markets with both procyclical and countercyclical technologies.

We investigate the impact of the ownership of electricity generation technologies, including fossil fuels and renewable energy sources, on the performance of electricity markets throughout the Energy Transition.

We examine the distributional impacts of RTP by leveraging on a country-wide field experiment that started in 2015, when RTP became the default option for most Spanish households. Our results suggest that the distributional impacts of RTP were quite small and, if anything, slightly progressive. We also find stronger differences in the impacts across regions than across income groups.

We estimate the impacts on employment of local firms and unemployment of local residents following investments in renewable energies. We exploit the variation in the timing and size of the investment projects across Spanish municipalities above 500 inhabitants, over a 17 years period.

Work in Progress

  • Designing Low Emission Zones: The Role of Transition Technologies (with Barahona, N., Imelda, and Montero, J. P.) We investigate whether hybrids qualify as transition technologies in the shift from combustion engines to electric vehicles (EVs), using Madrid’s Low Emission Zones (LEZ) as a case study. Allowing hybrids in LEZs increased their sales but had minimal impact on EV sales. A structural model evaluates car sales under different LEZ policy stringencies, shedding light on the optimal stringency policy and size of the LEZ.
  • “Unpacking the Distributional Implications of the Energy Crisis: Lessons from the Spanish Electricity Market” (with Clément Leblanc and Mateus Souza) COMING SOON!!

The surge in gas prices triggered by the war in Ukraine led to an unprecedented increase in electricity wholesale prices, which passed through to electricity retail prices. Regulatory interventions in wholesale and retail markets partly mitigated the impacts on consumers. In the context of the Spanish electricity market, this paper quantifies the distributional implications of the energy crisis and the subsequent market interventions, disentangling the distributional effects between consumers and electricity companies and across consumer groups.

  • “The Welfare Effects of Car Sharing” (with Erich Muehlegger and Mateus Souza)

We match data from several sources to understand mobility patterns across the city of Madrid. We then build models for the choice of transportation mode, as well as the city’s congestion technology, taking into account the availability of parking across different areas. Within this context, we aim to estimate the welfare effects of car sharing along several dimensions.

  • “Understanding power contracts: the costs of counterparty risk” (with Gerard Llobet)

Promoting renewable energies requires greater reliance on long-run contracting in electricity markets. Why do markets fail to provide enough liquidity for long-run contracts? In this paper, we characterize the equilibrium in the market for bilateral long-term contracts between electricity buyers and sellers. We show that the buyers’ counterparty risks enlarge default probabilities, giving rise to the under-provision of long-run contracts and under-investment in renewable energies. We also study the effects of proposed market interventions, such as public support for long-run contracting, public guarantees, regulatory-backed contracts, and buyers’ obligations to enter into long-term contracts.

Special Issues

Book Chapters

Policy Reports

In English:

In Spanish: